This paper documents the role of the collateral lending channel to facilitate small business starts and self-employment in the period before the financial crisis of 2008. We document that between 2002 and 2007 areas with a bigger run up in house prices experienced a strong increase in employment in small businesses compared to employment in large firms in the same industries. This increase in small business employment was particularly pronounced in (1) industries that need little startup capital and can thus more easily be financed out of increases in housing as collateral; (2) manufacturing industries where goods are shipped over long distances, which rules out that local demand is driving the expansion. We show that this effect is separate from an aggregate demand channel that relies on home equity based borrowing leading to increased demand and employment creation.
Introduction
The recession that followed the financial crisis of 2008 was marked by high and very persistent unemployment rates, which has drawn renewed interest to understanding the forces that affect labor market dynamics over the business cycle. The ensuing debate has focused on two primary explanations for the persistent unemployment. On the one side are researchers who argue that the recession was propagated by a dramatic decline in consumer demand, which was exacerbated by significant deleveraging at the household level and resulted in increased firm closures and unemployment.
2 See, for example, Romer (2011) or Mian and Sufi (2011a) .
On the other side are proponents of the idea that structural mismatches in the skill composition of parts of the work force explain the persistent unemployment, see for example Kocherlakota (2010) .
Similarly, Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo (2012) argue that these structural problems in the labor market were already present pre-2008, but were masked by the increase in house prices and the ensuing rise in labor demand in the construction industry. Others, most prominently Mulligan (2011), put forward that structural factors in labor market institutions, such as counter cyclical unemployment insurance, reduce the incentives of unemployed workers to reenter the labor market.
Our paper documents an alternative channel that has received much less attention but significantly affects the dynamics of employment creation over the business cycle: The impact of the collateral lending channel, especially mortgage lending, on self-employment and small business starts. Going back at least to the seminal papers by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) a number of theories have suggested that improvements in collateral values ease credit constraints for borrowers and can have multiplier effects on economic growth. This collateral lending channel builds on the idea that information asymmetries between banks and firms can be more easily alleviated when collateral values are high and therefore firms can have higher leverage (Rampini and Viswanathan, 2010) and that these problems are especially acute for small, more opaque, firms (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994 or Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993) . However, empirically it has been very difficult to cleanly identify the causal direction of the collateral effect. The challenge is that increased collateral values facilitate lending but in the reverse direction higher collateral values can also be the result of improvements in economic conditions (e.g., Iacovello, 2005) .
In this paper we take a different approach and look directly at shocks to the value of collateral, in particular the value of homes. In order to identify the causal effect of higher house prices we instrument for the growth in prices between 2002 and 2007 using the elasticity measure developed by Saiz (2010) , which uses exogenous geographical and regulatory constraints to housing supply.
The measure therefore differentiates areas where an increase in housing demand either translates into higher house prices and collateral value (low elasticity areas) or into higher volume of houses built (high elasticity). By relying on exogenous restrictions on the expansion of housing volumes, we separate out the effect of high collateral values on the creation of small businesses. This identification strategy is similar to the study by Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) , which looks at corporate investment decisions or Mian and Sufi (2011b) who look at increases in consumption from household leverage.
We show that leading up to the recession of 2008, areas with rising house prices (and increased leverage) experienced a significantly bigger increase in small business starts and a rise in the number of people who are employed in establishments with fewer than 10 employees compared to areas that did not see an increase in house prices. The same increase in employment cannot be found for large establishments in these same areas. In fact, the effect of house prices on job creation monotonically decreases with the size of the firms. This asymmetric effect on small versus large only holds for instrumented house prices, which suggests that the non-instrumented part of the variation (which is the one that captures endogenous demand) mostly impacts employment at larger firms. This asymmetry points to the interpretation of the collateral lending channel as an important driver of employment creation in small firms, since large firms have access to other forms of financing and thus should not be affected by this type of collateral channel.
While the result above supports the importance of the collateral channel for small business creation, there are two alternative hypotheses that must be ruled out as explaining our results. First, increasing house prices can drive local demand for goods (Campbell and Cocco, 2007) and, consequently, employment at non-tradable industries (Mian and Sufi, 2011a) . To the extent that small firms may be more sensitive to changes in demand (Kashyap and Stein, 1994) , the asymmetry in the results could reflect this increased demand rather than the collateral channel. The second alternative hypothesis comes from the fact that, by using housing and zoning restrictions for obtaining identification, we rely on cross sectional differences between high and low elasticity areas. This means that these areas could also vary along other dimensions, such as the level of economic vitality. For example, areas with low elasticity might not only see high house prices when demand for housing picks up, i.e. more available collateral, but they might also be the ones where more investment opportunities become available.
We devise a number of additional tests to meaningfully differentiate the impact of the collateral lending channel from these alternative hypotheses. First, we verify that the results are not driven by changing industry composition: Even within industries, areas with increasing house prices saw stronger employment growth in smaller establishments. 3 Second, and to further narrow in on the importance of collateral for business financing, we look at the variation across industries in the start-up capital that is needed to set up a new firm. The idea is that there are differences in the minimal feasible scale of businesses across industries and thus the availability of collateral should matter more depending on that minimal scale. For example, some businesses like home healthcare services can be started with small amounts of capital that could reasonably be financed through house price appreciation. In contrast, many sectors within manufacturing, for example, require large amounts of capital and fixed investments, and we do not expect the housing channel to be as effective since the capital needs are too high to be financed via individual loans against property. This strategy is similar to the approach used in Hurst and Lusardi (2004) .
Our results follow exactly the predicted pattern: when we repeat our regressions disaggregated by industries above and below the median needs in terms of start-up capital we find that the effect of house price growth on the creation of employment in small establishments is especially strong among industries with lower capital needs. These results confirm that the collateral lending channel played an important role in shaping employment dynamics. Borrowing against housing wealth allowed people in the areas with quicker house price appreciation to start small businesses and potentially alleviate the impact of job losses in the period leading up to 2008.
Third, we confirm that the results in our study are not driven by the non-tradable or the construction sectors. As pointed out above, if the relationship between house price increases and job creation in small firms was purely constrained to the non-tradable or construction sectors, one would be concerned that the results are not driven by changes in the collateral lending channel but by differences in local demand. However, our results hold for the manufacturing sector where 3 A similar relationship exists when we include proprietorships and unincorporated businesses in the regressions.
products are easily tradable, and more strongly so for manufacturing firms with low external financing needs. The difference in employment creation between large and small firms is also particularly strong for industries where firms report shipping goods across long distances. This distinguishes these results from the work of Mian and Sufi (2011a) , who show that areas where house prices increased most also exhibited an increase in unemployment in non-tradable industries due to deleveraging and lower demand in the aftermath of 2008. Any change in output in the low elasticity areas must therefore be driven by changes on the input (production) side. This is the collateral lending channel.
Finally, we also rule out that the results are driven by generally loosening credit standards in areas with quick house price growth. The concern would be that the growth of small businesses is not caused by better access to collateral but rather by easier access to other forms of credit because of banks' improved balance sheet position. We show that this is not the case. If anything, banks became increasingly more selective in credit approval in low elasticity areas leading up to 2007.
Using a similar calculation as Mian and Sufi (2011a) we calculate the approximate contribution of the collateral lending channel to changes in overall employment in the pre-crisis period. Using this approach the collateral channel can account for 10-25% of the increase in pre-crisis employment (depending on the assumptions we make about the reference group that best isolates the collateral effect), while the demand channel explains about 40% over the same time period. The two effects are mutually non-overlapping by construction. It is important to point out that these numbers provide rough approximations of the relative magnitudes of these two channels, but they ignore any general equilibrium effects in aggregation.
When we consider the period after the financial crisis when house prices started to decline (2007) (2008) (2009) we find that small firms experienced weaker employment declines than large firms in areas where the run-up in house prices was stronger in the period before the crisis. This means that smaller firms were more resilient than larger ones in those areas, suggesting that the firms created in the pre-period may have been good projects, in the sense that they did not immediately disappear with the advent of the crisis. However, to answer the question of whether these firms were, indeed, the ones that survived in the post crisis, we need more detailed (firm-level) data that would allow us to track individual firms over time.
Our study builds on a large micro literature that shows that credit constraints at the household level matter for the creation of new businesses (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989 , Holtz-Eakin et al, 1994 , Gentry and Hubbard, 2004 , or Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006 , although some authors have argued that this relationship is only present at the very top of the wealth distribution (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) .
At the same time, housing wealth in particular has been shown to be an important factor in the funding of business startups (Fan and White, 2003 , Fairlie and Krashinsky, 2012 , Fort, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2012 , and Black, de Meza and Jeffreys, 1996 for the UK). Previous work has also found that bank credit is an important source of financing for small businesses (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Robb and Robinson, 2012; Fracassi, Garmaise, Kogan and Natividad, 2013) , and that entrepreneurs often have to provide personal guarantees when they obtain financing (Berger and The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in the paper, as well as the empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses the results and Section 4 concludes.
Data and Empirical Methodology

Data Description
We obtain employment growth from the County Business Patterns (CBP) data set published by the U.S. Census Bureau. The CBP contains employment data by county, industry and establishment size (measured in number of employees) between 1998 until 2010 as of March of the reported year. We use the data at the 4-digit National American Industry Classification System (NAICS) level, broken down by county and establishment size to construct our main dependent variable of interest, the employment growth by establishment size between 2002 and 2007. The breakdown of establishments by the number of employees allows us to differentially estimate the effect of house price growth in the net creation of establishments of different sizes. 4 We use five establishment categories in our regressions that are commonly used by the Census Bureau -establishments of 1 to 4 employees, 5 to 9 employees, 10 to 19 employees, 20 to 49 and more than 50 employees. All these categories are given by the CPB except for the last one, where we aggregate all establishments of more than 50 employees. The CBP has multiple categories above 50
employees, but using each one individually would only add noise to our estimation, as they become rare at the county level, and even more so at the county and industry level, which we need for some of the specifications discussed below. In order to create the category of establishments with more than 50 employees we take the number of establishments in each category above 50 and multiply those by the midpoint of the category (for example, for the category of 100 to 249 employees we multiply the number of establishments by 174.5), and then we add all of them up. The data only includes the number of establishments in each county, industry and year by category of employment size (1-4 employees, 5-9, 10-19, etc.) , not the total employment for each establishment category. As such, in order to construct the employment in each bin we multiply the number of establishments by the middle point of each category. For example, in order to get the total employment of 1-4 employee establishments in a given industry, county and year, we multiply the number of establishments by 2.5.
to a total of 776 counties using the correspondence between MSAs and counties for the year 1999
provided by the Census Bureau. 5 Although employment growth and our other controls are available for a much larger sample of counties, all our regressions focus on the subset of counties for which we have the housing supply elasticity measure.
An important measure for our analysis is the amount of capital needed to start a firm, since these investment requirements might affect how much a given industry depends on the housing collateral channel. below the median to measure the differential effect of the collateral channel on business creation for industries in the two groups. The average amount of capital needed by firms below the median is 132 thousand dollars, whereas the average amount needed for industries above the median is 260 thousand dollars.
Our classification of "non-tradable", "tradable" and "construction" industries at the 4-digict NAICS level is obtained from Manufacturing industries include all 31-33 subsectors (Manufacturing), and in some specifications we restrict the sample to manufacturing industries that are also classified as "tradable" in Mian and Sufi (2011a) (i.e. those not in construction or in "other industries").
As we mention above, the measure for the amount of capital used to start a business is only available at the 2-digit NAICS level. In order to obtain a measure at a more detailed level that also captures the external financing requirements of firms, we use the external finance dependence measure developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998 In order to address the concern that the results might be driven by local demand, we construct a measure of the average distance that firms in an industry ship their goods. This data is available from the 2007 Census Commodity Flow Survey and it reports the distance traveled by shipments of a sample of establishments in each 3-digit NAICS manufacturing industry. 7 The unit of observation in the Census data is at the state and industry level, so we construct a dollar-weighted average distance of shipments also for each state and industry individually. Summary Statistics of the average distance shipped, as well as the frequency with which each industry appears in each decile, are shown in Table A5 .
We also use data on county-level births and deaths of establishments for each 2-digit NAICS The migrations data is extracted from the IRS county to county migration data series. The migration estimates are based on year-to-year address changes reported on individual income tax returns filed with the IRS. The dataset presents migration patterns by county for the entire United States and is split by inflows -the number of new residents who moved to a county and where they migrated from -and outflows -the number of residents leaving a county and where they went. 8 We also compute net flows as inflows minus outflows and we scale all figures by the number of non-movers in the county. The data is available from 1991 through 2009 filling years.
To better identify the effect of house prices on self-employment we include a set of controls that capture some of the cross-sectional differences across counties. and 2007 estimated from the CBP data. Our data includes a total of 775 counties with non-missing total employment data. Employment in all counties in our data grew by an average of 10.6 percent during the sample period, with the unemployment rate dropping by 0.9 percentage points. We also split the sample into counties above and below the median of the housing supply elasticity measure.
We see that counties with low supply elasticity are larger but have similar unemployment rates as those with high supply elasticity. The growth in total employment is somewhat lower in counties with high supply elasticity, and we discuss this fact in more detail when we discuss the regressions involving total employment and unemployment at the county level. As expected, counties with low elasticity of housing supply experienced much stronger growth in house prices than did counties with high elasticity of supply, and similarly experienced a much larger increase in average debt-toincome ratio (consistent with Mian and Sufi, 2011a).
Panel B of period, and especially so among the industries that we classify as having low start-up capital needs.
9 We construct the measure of competition from imports from China by multiplying the fraction of employment in each county and in each industry by the share of imported goods from China as a fraction of total domestic shipments in the industry in the United States. The variation is virtually the same if we instead use the growth in the weight of imports for each industry as a fraction of US domestic shipments between 1998 and 2005. The import data at the industry level is obtained from Peter K. Schott' website: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub_international.htm
Empirical Model
This paper aims to test whether increases in real estate prices affect the growth in employment by facilitating the creation of small businesses (collateral channel). To differentiate the collateral channel from a pure (expansionary) demand shock, we look at the differential effect of house prices on the net creation of establishments in different size categories. 10 Our identification relies on the idea that improved availability of collateral in the form of higher house prices can positively affect the creation of small businesses, while it is likely to have no effect on the creation of larger establishments since these firms cannot be started with capital that can be extracted from a house.
We measure the availability of collateral to small business entrepreneurs by the growth in house prices in the area where the establishment is located. However, it is challenging to establish a causal link from the availability of collateral to the creation of small businesses, since there are many omitted variables that could simultaneously affect both the value of real estate collateral and the demand faced by small businesses, for example changes in household income in the area or improvements in investment opportunities. In order to overcome this difficulty, we instrument for the changes in house prices during the period of interest for our study (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) using the elasticity of housing supply at the metropolitan statistical area, which was developed by Saiz (2010) .
Our identification relies on the assumption that the elasticity of housing supply only impacts employment creation at establishments of different sizes through its effect on house prices. The exclusion restriction will be violated if housing supply elasticity is correlated with employment or business creation for reasons other than house price growth. Similar approaches have been used extensively in the recent literature -see, for example, Mian and Sufi (2011a, 2011b) , Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo (2012); Robb and Robinson (2012) .
We rely on two basic regression specifications for our analysis. The first specification aggregates data up to the level at which our instrument varies, i.e. at the county-year-establishment size-level. Each individual observation is the change between 2002 and 2007 of employees in a given county, year and establishment size. Therefore we add up the number of employees in all industries in each 10 As we discuss in the data section, our data does not include changes in employment within establishments (i.e. along the intensive margin), so our measure of changes in employment relies on multiplying the number of establishments in each size category by the midpoint of the number of employees in each bin. It is thus equivalent to interpret our results in terms of number of employees or number of establishments.
establishment category and take the growth in total number of employees as the dependent variable.
We then run two-stage least squares regressions of the type: 
Δ
02−07 is the growth in house prices at the county level for the same time period where, as we discuss above, we instrument for the growth in house prices using the housing supply elasticity of Saiz (2010) . 1 is a set of dummy variables for each of the four included establishment categories (we omit the largest category of more than 50 employees). We then also include the product of the establishment size dummies and the growth in house prices, and 3 is the coefficient of interest in our regressions. In particular, the test we are interested in is whether the coefficient for the smallest establishments is larger (and positive) than those of the larger categories, which would confirm that house prices had a stronger impact on the creation of small establishments. benefit certain industries more than others and that these industries happen to be made up of smaller establishments on average (i.e., a "composition" effect).
We address these alternative demand hypotheses in a few different ways. First, by holding constant industry fixed effects we identify how employment in the smallest establishments reacts differently from that of large establishments within each 4-digit NAICS industry. This addresses the composition effect described above. Second, as we have argued before, a pure local demand story should affect establishments of all sizes similarly while the credit collateral channel is relevant mainly for small business. There is, however, still the possibility that smaller firms are more sensitive to local demand shocks than large firms. In order to see if this effect could explain our results we exclude the most obvious candidate industries that might directly benefit from local demand shocks due to higher house prices, namely those linked to construction and firms in the non-tradable sector as classified in Mian and Sufi (2011a) and we also repeat our tests only for manufacturing firms, those that should be least affected by local demand shocks.
Empirical Results
House Prices and Employment at Small Establishments
Our central hypothesis is that the availability of more valuable collateral (in our case through increased real estate prices) in the period before the financial crisis has an effect on the creation of small firms or on self-employment, since it provided individuals with easier access to startup capital.
As a result we should see a sharper increase in self-employment and employment in small businesses in areas that had steeper house price appreciation. We also expect this effect to be concentrated in firms in the smaller size categories, since large firms cannot finance themselves using home equity.
This hypothesis is tested in Table 2, percent. In the simple weighted least squares regression we see no distinction between the effect of house prices on small and large establishments. This result highlights the need for an instrument for our dependent variable of interest given the numerous factors that are likely to drive both employment creation and house prices (income growth, investment opportunities, etc.).
In column (3) of Table 2 we repeat the same regression but instrument the change in house prices with the Saiz measure for the elasticity of housing supply. We see that there is a positive but not significant causal relationship between county level employment change and house price growth on average, in contrast to the results in the previous column. However, when we look at the differential effect of instrumented house price changes, the increase in house prices has a significant and large positive effect on the small establishments but no significant effect on employment growth for big establishments (more than 50 employees). In fact, the coefficient on the interaction term between house price growth and the 1-4 employee size category shows that a 1 percentage point increase in house prices translates into a 0.19 percentage point increase in employment at these establishments relative to the largest ones. This translates into an increase in employment of 5.3 percentage points for a one standard deviation change in house prices, for an average change in employment at the smallest establishments of 9.4 percent (the effects of a one standard deviation change in house prices for each size category are shown in the appendix Table A3 ). Furthermore, the effect of collateral is monotonically decreasing with the size of the firm. For firms with more than 10 employees the effect is indistinguishable from that of the very largest firms. This is consistent with the collateral channel of house price appreciation being an important mechanism for small firm creation, since the amount of collateral that is provided by real estate appreciation is not be enough to start a larger firm. Also, these results suggest that the causal impact of house prices on employment growth during 2002 to 2007 did not work through increased demand, since in that case firms of all sizes (including the very large) should have been affected.
One concern with the above specification could be that the house prices change in areas with low Saiz housing elasticity induces a local demand shock that especially affects certain industries. If those industries are also, on average, disproportionately made up of smaller establishments, the result above might reflect a composition effect, rather than the collateral channel as we suggest. While it would need a number of factors to line up in a very specific way, we cannot rule it out on face value with the specifications in Table 2 . In order to eliminate the alternative hypothesis about industry composition, we now use our more disaggregated data, which provides data at the county, 4-digit NAICS and establishment size level. This allows us to hold industry fixed effects constant and test whether, conditional on an industry, the growth of small establishments is significantly stronger than that of large establishments in counties where house prices grew more. Intuitively, this specification asks whether within an industry the fraction of employment generated by small firms grows more quickly than that of large firms. This way we can confirm that the results are not a consequence of changing industry composition. The results for this specification are shown in column 4 of Table 2 .
Parallel to before, we find that impact of house price changes (instrumented with the Saiz measure)
is stronger for establishments with 1-4 employees when compared to the bigger firm categories. We again find that the effect is monotonically decreasing and not statistically significant beyond firms with 10 employees.
In order to confirm that the effect we estimated runs through the collateral channel, we test whether our estimated effect is stronger in industries that have lower start-up capital needs. We expect this to be the case given that the median total amount of home debt at its peak in 2006 for all US households was approximately 117 thousand dollars (Mian and Sufi, 2011b) and that only a fraction of this amount would be available for use in starting a business. Also, Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2012) show that the average value of a single family home during this period is approximately 309 thousand dollars and that most families obtain an 80 percent LTV loan. Even accounting for the fact that most entrepreneurs are over 35 years old, and that almost half are over 45 (Robb and Robinson, 2012) , and so we expect them to have built home equity relative to the initial 80 percent LTV, it is not plausible to finance a very large amount of capital using home equity as collateral.
We split our sample of industries at the median amount of capital needed to start a firm to explore this source of variation. As we describe in Section 2, we obtain this information from the Census Survey of Business Owner Public Microdata Survey by selecting the sample of new firms in each industry and averaging the amount of capital needed to start those firms.
We show the results split by the amount of start-up capital needed in each industry in columns 5 through 8 of Table 2 . The results show that the effect of collateral on employment growth in small establishments is stronger for industries where the amount of capital needed to start a firm is lower (the average amount of start-up capital for industries below the median is approximately 132 thousand dollars). In fact, for this subset of industries the effect is statistically significantly different from that of the largest group even for establishments up to 49 employees, i.e. the causal effect of house prices extends to establishments other than the very smallest. When we include industry fixed effects only the coefficient on the smallest establishments is statistically different from zero. For the group of industries that require more start-up capital the effect of house prices on employment is smaller and only statistically significant for the very smallest group both with and without fixed effects. These results confirm that job creation at small businesses in response to house prices changes is strongest in industries with low startup capital needs that can reasonably be financed through loans on home equity.
In addition, we also document that our results are not driven by certain industries, in particular not by construction or non-tradable industries. One might be concerned that the increase in house prices led to an increase in demand for construction services or for local services (e.g. local retail or restaurants) and thus new firms got started in these industries because that (e.g. more remodeling
and new housing construction, more dry-cleaners, etc.). This would be a consequence of increased demand rather than an effect through the collateral channel. We re-run our main specifications excluding all industries linked to either construction or the non-tradable industries as classified by
Mian and Sufi (2011a) and the direction and magnitude of the effects are virtually unchanged. We also run our regressions only for the manufacturing sector given that these are the industries that should be least affected by local demand. We report these results in Table 3 . This confirms that a simple demand side story is not driving our results and thus confirms the importance of the collateral channel for the creation of smaller establishments in the period between 2002 and 2007.
In Table 4 we perform two additional tests only for the sample of manufacturing industries. In these tests we split industries based on their needs for external finance, as well as the average distance of shipments in each 3-digit NAICS industry. Similarly to when we consider the amount of start-up capital needed in an industry, we expect the collateral effect to matter more in industries that have low external financing needs, as those are much more likely to be met by using housing as collateral.
The advantage of this measure is that it is at a 4-digit NAICS industry level, which allows us to split manufacturing industries into those that are above and those that are below the median dependence on external finance using Compustat. The first two columns of Table 4 confirm that our result is driven only by industries that have below median needs of external finance. When we consider the distance at which industries ship their goods, the last 4 columns of Table 4 show that our result is driven exclusively by industries that typically ship goods across large distances. This further mitigates the concern that our results reflect local demand and instead points to the collateral channel we emphasize.
Magnitude of the Collateral Effect Relative to Previous Work
One way to give a rough estimate of the importance of the collateral channel is to compare the magnitude of the employment gains that can be attributed to this channel to those that can be assigned to the demand channel shown in Mian and Sufi (2011a) . To do so, we follow the same calculation used in that paper to aggregate the effect across all counties. We now turn to the calculation of the magnitude of the collateral channel over the same time period.
Here we rely on the differential impact of house prices on employment creation at small firms relative to firms with more than 50 employees and we focus on the specifications where we exclude nontradable industries and construction. (Table 3 , column 2). We again first compute predicted countylevel employment gains for these industries (relative to the 10 th percentile county) and then we aggregate to all counties. When we do that, we obtain an estimated total job gain in firms with less than 50 employees relative to those with more than 50 employees of 1.698 million jobs in all counties, or 27.8 percent of jobs created between 2002 and 2007 in this period. If we restrict our attention to the specification where the demand explanation for our results is the least plausible, i.e.
the manufacturing sector and, in particular, firms in industries and states where the shipment 11 Using county-level debt-to-income ratio or the run-up in house prices between 2002 and 2007 as the independent variable (as we do in this paper) yields virtually the same results, as counties with high debt-to-income by the end of this period are also the ones that experienced large increases in home values. 12 This is done in four steps. First, the authors compute the county-level predicted change in employment in nontradable industries by multiplying the regression coefficient by the independent variable in each county (in this case the DTI) and subtracting the predicted change in the 10 th percentile county (to avoid being affected by outliers at the bottom of the distribution). 12 Second, they multiply the predicted county-level change by the non-tradable employment in the county as of the beginning of the period to obtain a predicted change in employment in terms of numbers of workers for each county. Third, the authors sum up the predicted changes across all counties, to obtain an economywide predicted change in the non-tradable sector (in their case, a total of 769 thousand jobs). Fourth and finally, they divide this number by the share of total employment in the economy represented by the non-tradable sector (19.6%), which then yields a total predicted loss in employment due to the aggregate demand shock of approximately 6 million jobs.
distance is largest (column 6 of Table 4), the same computation would yield an estimate of 676 thousand jobs, or about 11 percent of the total of jobs created in this period and subset of counties.
The magnitude we estimate above is a lower bound for the total importance of collateral for job creation for a couple of reasons. First, our data does not allow us to track firms over time, so if a firm grows to become very large we do not attribute the employment creation of that firm to our effect (it would be in the 50+ category that we use as our baseline). Second, we are focusing on the importance of this channel for very small firms. This ignores the role that collateral value plays for larger firms, as pointed out in Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) and Cvijanovic (2012).
Finally, we should point out that this exercise is useful as a comparison to previous work and not as a proper calibration of the importance of the collateral effect for the whole economy. In extending the effect that we observe for a subset of firms and industries in individual counties to the whole economy, we ignore general equilibrium effects that could potentially be important.
Births and Deaths of Establishments
Our measure of growth of establishments by size category does not allow us to directly observe the creation and destruction of establishments, as all we can measure is the change in the number of establishments in each category as of March of each year. In a separate set of regressions shown in Table 5 we use the Statistics of US Businesses from the Census to look at births and deaths of establishments at the 2-digit NAICS industry level. The disadvantage of this dataset is that it does not include the breakdown of establishments by their employment size, but it does help us to check that our result holds when we consider births of all establishments. Given that an overwhelming percentage of new businesses are very small businesses (Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2011; Robb and Robinson, 2012) , this robustness test directly speaks to the validity of our main results.
We find that births of establishments are very strongly affected by increasing house prices instrumented with the elasticity of housing supply. The result holds when we consider the net creation of establishments (i.e. births minus deaths) and the coefficient is unchanged when we include 2 digit NAICS fixed effects (which is the finest industry category available in this dataset at a 
Sole Proprietorships
We now expand our analysis to include the creation of businesses without employees, also called sole proprietorships or nonemployer businesses. Table 6 shows the effect of house price growth on net creation of proprietorships relative to all the establishment categories that we have in the previous tables using the Saiz measure to instrument for exogenous movements in house price changes. The first column in this table uses employment data on sole proprietorships from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, while the last three columns rely on data on nonemployer establishments from the Census (which includes information on the 2 digit NAICS sector in which the establishment operates). The coefficient on house price growth in Column (1) interacted with the sole proprietorship category is significantly different from that on the largest establishments and close in magnitude to that on the 1-4 employee category. In Column (2) we use data from the Census and find a smaller coefficient on the sole proprietorships and we cannot distinguish that coefficient from the others in the regression.
In the last two columns we again split the sample by the amount of capital that is needed to start a business in a given industry as discussed above. We find that the effect of house prices on the net creation of sole proprietorships is stronger in industries with low start-up capital needs, which is in line with our findings for the other size categories. We should note, however, that the difference between the coefficients in the two specifications (below and above median capital needs) is not statistically significant.
Crisis Period (2007-2009)
One question that remains regarding the establishments that were created as a consequence of the increasing value of collateral during the run-up in house prices is whether these establishments were then eliminated once the housing bubble burst. The question is whether these were particularly fragile firms that were disproportionately affected by the crisis or whether, on the other hand, they
were not of different quality relative to the rest of the firms in the economy.
Given the data we currently have we cannot give a definite answer to this question. The problem is that we are not able to track individual establishments, which means we cannot know if the specific firms that were created in the 2002-2007 period survived the crisis or not. We can, however, test whether small establishments in general were more or less likely to downsize or disappear in the crisis. Put differently, we can assess whether employment loss was stronger at larger or smaller firms during the crisis in counties where the increase in house prices had been stronger in the pre-period (which are also the most levered counties as shown in Mian and Sufi, 2011a). We run those regressions in Table 7 .
The results show that employment loss was similar across large and small establishments or, if anything, it seems to have been worse at large firms (in the specifications without industry fixed effects) in counties where house prices went up more. This suggests that, at least as a group, small firms were no more likely to destroy jobs as a consequence of the increased leverage accumulated during the pre-crisis period. This is consistent with the findings of Mian and Sufi (2011a) regarding the non-tradable industries for this period.
In Appendix Table A5 we also show that the effect of house price growth in the period before the crisis is similar for proprietorships as it is for 1-4 employee establishments, which suggests that the result is not being driven solely by firms shrinking and transferring across the bins in our analysis (for example, 10-19 employee establishments becoming smaller and appearing as 5-9 employee establishments). Given that proprietorships are a different form of business entity altogether, it is very unlikely that 1-4 employee firms are falling into the proprietorship category during this period.
Total Employment and Migration
We finally want to consider the effect of house price changes on total employment as measured in the County Business Pattern (CBP). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show county level regressions of change in Total Employment on house prices changes instrumented with the Saiz measure. Column
(2) includes a number of county level controls such as population size, average educational attainment, and unemployment rate in the pre-period. We find that house price growth had no causal effect on total employment: the coefficient on house price changes is close to zero and insignificant in either of the specifications. In contrast, when we repeat the same regression set up using the level of unemployment as the dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 , we find a significant and negative relationship both with and without controls. Finally, in Columns (5) and (6) we show that house price changes also had a negative impact on the unemployment rate;, consistent with the results of Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo (2012). How can the negative effect on unemployment be reconciled with no changes in total employment? Our results suggest that the decrease in unemployment captures the transition of some agents in the labor force from being job seekers to a self-employment status. However, these people are not observed in the total employment measure, since the CBP data does not include non-employee firms (sole proprietorships).
Finally we also look at the net migration of people in and out of the county. We measure net migration as the difference between inflows and outflows at the county level. We repeat the same regression set up in Column (7) and (8) to estimate the effect of house appreciation on county to county migration and find that higher house prices caused a net out-migration from the counties with high house price appreciation. In unreported regressions we confirm that this was produced by larger outflows than inflows into those counties. This evidence is consistent with the idea that house prices affected the composition of households in each county and, therefore, indirectly affected the labor market dynamics.
Credit Conditions and Elasticity of Housing Supply
One possible concern with the instrument we use is that the behavior of lenders in high and low elasticity areas during our time frame was different. Specifically, if it became easier to obtain credit in low elasticity areas relative to high elasticity areas during our sample period for reasons unrelated to collateral availability, and if this drove the creation of new businesses, this would violate the exclusion restriction for our instrument. One mechanism for such an effect would be that banks might become laxer on all their credit decisions because of the improvement on the quality of their mortgage portfolio due to higher house prices. While it is not obvious why this should necessarily affect small business credit provision, we want to address this concern directly.
To test whether such an effect is plausible, we use data on denial rates of mortgage applications from HMDA. The underlying assumption is that the cross-sectional variation on the looseness of credit conditions should be positively correlated with the same variation for mortgage credit, especially given that the reason why credit might have become laxer is the fact that house prices increased.
We consider the number of applications that are denied by financial institutions as a proportion of the total loan applications in a county and in a year. 13 Using the yearly estimates we compute the proportional change in denial rates between 2002 and 2007. We focus on loans used for purchasing homes as they are less sensitive to the issue of relationship lending and/or private lender information about the borrower, and therefore should better reflect the loosening of credit conditions.
Panel A of Table 9 shows that credit conditions tightened rather than loosened in low elasticity areas (those below median elasticity in the sample) when we use this measure of credit supply. Denial rates increased by about 2 percentage points in counties with low elasticity of housing supply, whereas they go down in high elasticity areas by one percentage points, i.e. credit loosened in those areas.
The difference between the two types of counties is statistically significant at the one percent level.
Additionally, total volume of applications decreases by one percent in low elasticity areas in comparison to the 10 percent increase in the high elasticity areas.
We formally test these differences in a regression framework using a continuous elasticity measure as our independent variable. Panel B of Table 9 shows the results of those regressions. Consistent with the summary statistics of Panel A, we find that lower elasticity if associated with higher denial rates of loan applications and these results are robust to different specification and controls.
Overall, this result allows us to rule out the concern that our instrument is picking up changes in the way that lenders granted credit instead of access to credit through an increase in collateral values.
Conclusion
13 Volume of applications is calculated as the sum of all loans that are originated plus applications that are approved but not accepted, applications denied by the financial institution and loans purchased by the financial institution itself.
Overall, the evidence we present in this paper identifies the causal effect house prices in the creation of new small firms. These results show that access to collateral allowed individuals to start small businesses or to become self-employed. We conjecture that without access to this collateral in the form of real estate assets, many individuals would not have made the transition from unemployment to starting a new business or self-employment.
We show that the effect of house prices is concentrated in small firms only and had no causal effect on employment at large firms. Importantly, our results also hold when we exclude industries that are most likely to be affected by local demand shocks and when we restrict our attention to manufacturing industries. The effect of house prices is also stronger in industries where the amount of capital needed to start a new firm is lower, consistent with the hypothesis that housing serves as collateral but is not sufficient to fund large capital needs. , and each interaction is with a dummy indicator for the size of the establishment. All regressions include 4-digit industry fixed effects. Column 1 shows the results when we exclude construction industries, column 2 excludes both construction and nontradable industries, column 3 includes only manufacturing industries (NAICS 31-33) and column 4 has manufacturing industries that are classified as "tradable" in Mian and Sufi (2011a). All regressions control for the natural logarithm of population, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the labor force that is employed, the share of the population in the workforce, and the percentage of homes that are owneroccupied. All controls are at a county level for the year 2000 and are obtained using Census Bureau Data Summary Files. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered by MSA. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Becker (2007) . This measure is given by the average difference (for each 4-digit NAICS industry) between each firm's capital expenditures and its operating cash flow, scaled by capital expenditures. Data for distance shipped is from the Census Commodity Flow Survey for 2007 and represents a dollar-weighted average of shipment distance calculated at the 3-digit NAICS and state of origin level. The third and fourth columns split industries and states based on the 30 th percentile of the shipment distance distribution, whereas the last two columns split the sample at the median distance (about 600 miles). All regressions control for the natural logarithm of population, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the labor force that is employed, the share of the population in the workforce, and the percentage of homes that are owner-occupied. All controls are at a county level for the year 2000 and are obtained using Census Bureau Data Summary Files. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered by MSA. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 5 .
House Price Growth and Creation of Establishments
The table shows two-stage least squares regressions of establishment births and deaths on house price growth instrumented with the elasticity of housing supply. Each observation is at a county level for the regressions without sector fixed effects (odd numbered columns) and at a county and 2-digit NAICS industry level whenever we include fixed effects (even numbered columns). All regressions are weighted by the number of households in a county as of 2000. House Price Growth is instrumented using the Saiz (2010) The data on growth in proprietorships is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the first column and from the Census in columns 2 through 4. All regressions control for the natural logarithm of population, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the labor force that is employed, the share of the population in the workforce, and the percentage of homes that are owner-occupied. All controls are at a county level for the year 2000 and are obtained using Census Bureau Data Summary Files. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered by MSA. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
BEA Data Census Data
Start-up Capital < P50 (Census) , and each interaction is with a dummy indicator for the size of the establishment. Columns 1 and 2, All Industries, shows the results for the whole sample of firms (first the weighted least squares results and then the IV), columns 3 through 6 show the coefficients split by the start-up capital amount. The omitted category refers to firms with 50 or more employees. The first column for each sample of industries is aggregated at the county and establishment size level, whereas the second column is at the county, establishment size and industry level, and includes industry fixed effects. All regressions control for the natural logarithm of population, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the labor force that is employed, the share of the population in the workforce, and the percentage of homes that are owner-occupied. All controls are at a county level for the year 2000 and are obtained using Census Bureau Data Summary Files. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered by MSA. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 9 . Denial Rates
All Industries
This Table shows the relationship between mortgage denial rates and mortgage volume at a county level and the elasticity of housing supply. Total application volume is calculated as the sum of all loans that are originated plus applications that are approved but not accepted, applications denied by the financial institution and loans purchased by the financial institution itself in each county and year, all scaled by the total number of households in a county as of 2000. Denial rates are computed as the proportion of applications denied by the financial institution over total volume in each county and year. All the data is extracted from HMDA LAR records. Panel A shows the average denial rates and average volume in 2002 and 2007, as well as the change in these variables during this period for counties above and below the median elasticity of housing supply in the sample. Panel B shows OLS regressions of the change in denial rate the change in total volume of applications on housing supply elasticity as a continuous variable and controls (debt to income level and changes, the natural logarithm of the population, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the labor force that is employed, the share of the population in the workforce, the percentage of homes that are owner-occupied). All regressions are weighted by the number of households as of 2000. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. , and each interaction is a dummy indicator for the size of the establishment. All regressions include 4-digit industry fixed effect and control for log of population, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the labor force that is employed, the share of the population in the workforce, and the percentage of homes that are owner-occupied. We drop the top and bottom one percentile of the change in employment in each county, industry and establishment category. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered by MSA. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. The data on growth in proprietorships is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the first column and from the Census in columns 2 through 4. All regressions control for the natural logarithm of population, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the labor force that is employed, the share of the population in the workforce, and the percentage of homes that are owner-occupied. All controls are at a county level for the year 2000 and are obtained using Census Bureau Data Summary Files. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered by MSA. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel
BEA Data Census Data
Start-up Capital < P50 (Census)
Start-up Capital > P50 (Census) Growth in House Prices -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14** Mian and Sufi (2011a) . All regressions control for the natural logarithm of population, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the labor force that is employed, the share of the population in the workforce, and the percentage of homes that are owner-occupied. All controls are at a county level for the year 2000 and are obtained using Census Bureau Data Summary Files. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered by MSA. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
